No restraints tor search engine free#

There is no magical insight out of dark nothing and nowhere. Any creative person or inventive engineer can show you the boring, methodical way to define a problem solution. You can fix Tor if you really want to, but you'll notice an odd internal resistance to the very solutions that are clear and self-apparent. Any insider can tell you that the core, fundamental strategy of the NSA is to use the mathematical 'attractor phenomenon.' The MORE one uses, that person is self-selecting as even MORE worthy of attention. You can deny it to yourselves so you can sleep nights, but that is the entire point of it. Solutions for Tor's problems are known and available, but you won't adopt them because the real and ultimate truth is that Tor has always been an NSA honey-pot. Also, using transient bridge addresses (a la Flashproxy) could be a big step forward in the arms race. Maybe that's a difference that matters in practice.

A rule that involves grabbing a snapshot of IP addresses means pushing out new rules much more often. A simple DPI rule is one that they can write, deploy, and leave in place for weeks or months. The latter seems much harder.Īll of this said, I'm increasingly thinking that some sort of better obfuscation layer by default, between clients and the Tor network, would be useful. Doing traffic obfuscation to defeat a real-time adversary who is deciding whether to filter you is quite different from doing obfuscation to defeat an adversary that computes on the flows after-the-fact. We could easily imagine xkeyscore rules to recognize obfs2 flows, including a 'does it have at least this much entropy' rule. Second, the list of relays is still public, so they could still recognize Tor flows by their endpoints.Īlso, the rules published in this article are not the entirety of their rules.

No restraints tor search engine free#

First, it isn't actually free to layer obfs3 on top of things - many of the fastest relays are CPU-bound from doing AES, and adding an obfs3 layer effectively doubles the amount of work they'd do. Good thinking, but it's not clear to me that this step would help as much as you hope. Does reading the contents of those mails violate the wiretap act? Now I understand how the Google engineers felt when they learned about the attacks on their infrastructure.

Their attack on the bridge address distribution service shows their 'collect all the things' mentality - it's worth emphasizing that we designed bridges for users in countries like China and Iran, and here we are finding out about attacks by our own country. Trying to make a list of Tor's millions of daily users certainly counts as widescale collection. Just learning that somebody visited the Tor or Tails website doesn't tell you whether that person is a journalist source, someone concerned that her Internet Service Provider will learn about her health conditions, or just someone irked that cat videos are blocked in her location. Tor has gone mainstream in the past few years, and its wide diversity of users - from civic-minded individuals and ordinary consumers to activists, law enforcement, and companies - is part of its security. Tor's anonymity is based on distributed trust, so observing traffic at one place in the Tor network, even a directory authority, isn't enough to break it. We've been thinking of state surveillance for years because of our work in places where journalists are threatened. As quoted in the original article on Das Erste: